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In the Supreme CoUrt
of the State of Utah
SCOTT ANDERSON, FRED H. SHEPARD, EARL M. BAKER, RICHARD W. TIPPITTS, and EARL J.
KNUDSON,

Plaintiffs and Apptllants,
vs.

Case No. 8140

W. ADRIAN WRIGHT and W.
MEEKS WIRTHLIN, partners, doing business under the names and
style of WRIGHT- WIRTHLIN
REALTORS,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this brief, plaintiffs and appellants will be referred to as plaintiffs, defendants· and respondents will be
referred to as defendants. All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
December, 195 3, plaintiffs commenced a consolidated action against defendants. In such action plaintiffs individually
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prayed judgment against defendants for amounts claimed to
be due from defendants under similar oral contracts (R. 1).
The total amount demanded was $16,375.35. At trial, it appearing to the court that the claims asserted were clearly unsupported in the evidence, plaintiffs were allowed to file an
amended complaint wherein it was alleged that plaintiffs
undertook to sell certain houses in a subdivision of Salt Lake
County known as Morningside Heights; that the commission per
house sold was to be $100.00; that certain houses were sold·
'
that certain amounts remain unpaid; that such amounts are
presently due and owing from defendants to plaintiffs (R. 5).
The jury found for plaintiffs on the amended complaint
(R. 230). After judgment and on motion of defendants, the
trial· court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict
(theretofore made and taken under advisement) and entered
judgment for defendants notwithstanding the verdict (R.
232 and 237). The trial court's action was bottomed on the
insufficiency of the evidence to support a present contractural
duty in defendants to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded in
the amended complaint. The sole question for determination
on appeal is the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict of the jury.
In 1950, Felt Syndicate, a corporation, was engaged in
the development of a Salt Lake County subdivision known as
Morningside Heights. It was the sponsor of the development
and the seller of the lots and homes making up the subdivision.
Defendants, after a considerable expenditure of time and
effort, entered into an arrangement with Felt Syndicate to
exclusively broker for Felt Syndicate the sale of one hundred
4
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lots and unbuilt houses in the development at a commission
of $300.00 per house (Exhibit 4). In April or May of 1950
opportunity to assist in this enterprise was ~xtended by defendants to the plaintiffs and others as members of defendants'
sales force (R. 89, 111). Defendants and plaintiffs entered
into an arrangement wherein plaintiffs, among others, were
given an opportunity to sell or take orders for certain lots and
unbuilt homes in Morningside Heights. The proposed cotl].~
pensation to plaintiffs per unbuilt house and lot sold "'as to
be $100.00 (R. 111, R. 112). Neither the defendants as the
broker nor the salesmen were to receive from Felt Syndicate,
the seller, any n1onies at the time an ord.er was taken or a
house was sold (R. 50, 52, 122). Commissions earned were to
be paid over by Felt Syndicate, the seller, on a deferred basis
at certain designated times corresponding to the tirnes vlhen
the houses being built had reached certain designated stages
of completion. Commissions were to be paid over by the seller
through its disbursal agent to the broker, W right-Wirthlin,
who upon receipt of the monies from the seller would in turn
disburse to the salesmen their proportionate share of the commissions earned (R. 70, 112, 161, 183, 202-203, 207, 208).
For ease of bookkeeping the broker and plaintiffs agreed that
the broker would accumulate the monies received from the
seller until such time as the broker had received sufficient
monies from the seller to disburse to the plaintiffs amounts
equal to 25 per cent of $100 (R. 55-56; 208, 209).
Plaintiffs and additional members of defendants' sales
force took orders for and sold all of the lots and unbuilt
houses in Felt Syndicate's development. Felt Syndicate, the

5
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seller, through its disbursal agent intermittently paid over to
the broker, Wright-Wirthlin, monies aggregating $12,790.74.
Out of the amount thus received, defendant brokerage disbursed to plaintiffs their proportionate share, in the amounts
and at the times as set forth in Exhibit 3. Felt Syndicate in
addition to the monies paid to defendant brokerage, assigned
to defendants twelve lot options of the reasonable value of
$1800.00. In return defendant brokerage extinguished $1800.00
of the amount due from Felt Syndicate on the total commissions and immediately disbursed to plaintiffs cash equal to
their proportionate share of said credit. Total credits and
monies received from Felt Syndicate aggregate $14-,590.74
out of which as set forth in Exhibit 3, plaintiffs have received
slightly more than their proportionate share.
There remains unpaid by Felt Syndicate the sum of $15,409.26 out of which if and when received by defendants, defendants will pay over to plaintiffs their proportionate share
according to the terms and conditions of their sales arrangement.
There is no question that a sales arrangement was entered
into between plaintiffs and defendants (R. 111, 112). The
problem is as to the duty on the part of defendants to presently
pay over to plaintiffs the amounts demanded in the amended
complaint. The court ably instructed the jury as follows in
pointing up that matter:
Now the parties have stipulated that such a
contract was entered into. There is however, left and
in dispute the terms and conditions under which these
commissions were to be paid and the question of
Ct

•••

whether or not there are any commissions no·w due and
owing to these plaintiffs from these defendants ...
6
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* * * The things you must find

in favor of these
plaintiffs and against these defendants is the following:
n

n

* * * (2)

That under and pursuant to the terms

of the contract the commissions are now due, owing
and payable from these defendants to these plaintiffs

... · " (R. 223, 224).
The court when it speaks of the ((terms of the contract" is,
of course, referring to the oral contract between plaintiffs and
defendants.
Plaintiffs have spent considerable space in their brief
talking around and about fraud and overeaching. Suffice to
call to the court's attention that neither in the original complaint nor in the amended complaint is there any allegation
of fraud or wrongdoing. Plaintiffs do not raise on appeal any
allegation of error on the part of the trial court in admitting
or excluding evidence of the insinuated fraud. It is elementary
that one who brings an action footed in fraud must allege his
facts with particularity. See Rule 9-b. Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. It would seem that that which was neither alleged
in the original nor the amended complaint can hardly with
propriety be argued on appeal.

POINT I
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
A PRESENT CONTRACTUAL DUTY IN DEFENDANTS
TO PAY PLAINTIFFS THE AMOUNTS DEMANDED IN
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
7
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
A PRESENT CONTRACTUAL DUTY IN DEFENDANTS
TO PAY PLAINTIFFS THE AMOUNTS DEMANDED IN
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The trial court correctly granted judgment for defendants and
against plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict because of the insufficiency of the evidence to support a present contractual
duty in defendants to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded in
the amended complaint.
There is no dispute as to plaintiff's general statement
of the law applicable in the cases of this nature. The applicable proposition of law is well known and generally accepted. The law is well stated in the case of Morby v. Rogers,
____ Utah ____ ,. 252 P 2d 231, p. 232 as follows:
~]t

is well settled that in order for a court to grant
a request for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict grounded on non-negligence
of defendant, the record must disclose no evidence
against the party so requesting upon which reasonable
minds could find him guilty of the negligence charged.
The issue here, then was whether the record disclosed
any evidence upon which the jury could have found
the appellant guilty of negligence.''
Though the above quoted case sounds in tort and the instant case sounds in contract, the general rule is equally applicable. See Scoville v. Kelloggs Sales Company, ____ Utah ____ ,
261 P 2d 933. Translated to a contract fact situation, the
rule could be stated as follows:
8
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nit is well settled that in order for a court to grant a
request for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because of the non-existence
of a contractural duty sought to be imposed, the record
must disclose no evidence against the party so requesting from which reasonable minds could infer the existence of the duty."
An examination of the evidence reveals no evidentiary
base to support the required inference of a present contractual
duty in defendants to personally pay plaintiffs the sums demanded. One needs ask, if such a purported duty exists, at
what point in time did it arise? An examination of the evidence (in preference to the assertions of plaintiffs) will, of
course, reveal that such a duty has yet to arise. It is the position
of the defendants that it was within the contemplation and
agreement of defendants and their sales force that the defendants' duty to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded would
arise only upon receipt by defendants from the seller, Felt
Syndicate, of the commission monies earned.
This position is based on two evidentiary foundations.
( 1) The express understanding of the parties as revealed by
their testimony. (2) The custom of the real estate business.
The evidence is without dispute that more than one half
of the commission monies earned has yet to be received by
the defendants from Felt Syndicate, the seller. Felt Syndicate,
of course, suffered financial reverses. That fact supplies the
revealing reason for the commencement of this lawsuit. The
revealing facts indicated in the testimony excerpts which follow, are that all parties contemplated ( 1) defendant broker
would receive the monies from the seller prior to his payment

9
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over to the salesmen of their proportionate share, and ( 2) as
a general custom a broker would not pay out of his own pocket
sales commissions on a. deal that had "gone sour."
Beginning at R. 48, plaintiff Anderson testified that his
sales commissions were going to come on a basis different from
usual; that rather than dividing with the broker at the time
of sale the commission extracted from the usual down payment,
no monies were to be received initially; that the first installment
on the commission was to be made at some tim~ in the future;
that commissions were to come on a deferred, periodic, basis;
that defendants were to collect the commissions fron1 Felt
Syndicate, the seller; that defendants were to retain the commissions thus collected until they had sufficient monies credited
to plaintiffs to disburse commissions to plaintiffs in amounts
equal to 2 5 per cent of commissions earned; that on several
occasions defendants did disburse to plaintiff Anderson commission payments which were received by Anderson at the
times paid without protest or demands for additional payment.
At page 70 of the Record the following testimony of plaintiff
Anderson is recorded:

"Q. So, by way of recapitulation you, at the time of
the Morningside Heights transaction, agreed to
sell these homes for the sum of $100.00 apiece.

*

*

*

*

"A. Yes.

ceQ. And you understood that the payments were to
come from Wright-Wirthlin, that they were to
collect the payments for you did you not?

CCA. Yes.
10
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nQ. And that they were to disburse them to you as they
received them on a deferred basis, based on the
degree of completion of the homes you had sold?
nA. Yes."
A fair and reasonable reading of this testimony indicates
that plaintiff Anderson contemplated receipt by defendants
from Felt Syndicate of the commission monies prior to the
time they were to be disbursed to the salesmen. The nzonies
U'ere to be accumulated until the sum was large enough to
pay out to plaintiff salesmen with bookkeeping ease. Certainly
such an arrangement would be unnecessary if the duty to pay
arose in defendants prior to the time the monies were received.
It was in addition, initially contemplated that the broker would
obtain from the seller monies at various stages of house construction. One of the stages was the final completion of the
houses. Mr. Anderson at page 58 in response to an inquiry
states:
nA. The homes that I have sold have been occupied
by the people who purchased, or subsequently purchased and sold, for many months, and I still believe they aren't considered as having been completed.''
He further states at page 59 of the Record:
CCA. No, I don't know if they are 100 per cent completed or not."
The testimony of others, including Mr. Doidge of the financing
institution, re-affirm the non-completion of the homes (R.
138, 15 7, 167-168).
Plaintiff Baker reinforces the position of defendants on
page 99 of the Record where the following questions were put
and the following answers gtven:
11
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CtQ. Mr. Baker, have you ever been paid on a cotnmission that the broker didn't receive the money first?
teA. No, I don't think I have. That question is a little
strange though, Reed. Can I qualify it a little?

HQ. Just answer my question if you will. Let me guide
you along. Mr. King will bring anything out, I'm
sure. You have never had a broker pay you a commission on a deal that has gone sour, have you,
out of his own pocket?

HA. No.

C(Q. You didn't expect it?
(CA. No, I didn't expect it."
Plaintiff Baker testified in addition that the commissions
were to be paid on a deferred basis; that he understood Felt
Syndicate was the seller; that he would like to get his money
from whoever owes it.
Plaintiff Knudson testified as follows on page 112 of the
Record:

'Q. And isn't it is the custom that the salesman doesn't
receive his money until the broker does ?
There are different circumstances on that. When
you sell a house you usually bring in enough money
to pay that commission.
That is correct. But the general rule is that the
salesman doesn't get his money until the broker
does, isn't it ?
That's right."
He further testified on page 115 of the Record as follows:

"Q. It is customary that the seller pays the commission
on these sales, isn't it?

12
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HA. That's right.
HQ. And you expected that this situation was usual
and when the seller would pay the money to
Wright-Wirthlin they would pay you would they
not?
HA. If they got it.
((Q. You knew that they would pay it if they got it?
((A. Yes, I had confidence in Wright-Wirthlin."
And at page 116 of the Record, plaintiff Knudson states
further:
HQ. You didn't expect them (Wright-Wirthlin) to pay
you from their own monies on this transaction
did you, Mr. Knudson?
HA. I wasn't under that

impression.'~

Plaintiff Shepard's testimony didn't materially differ from
that of the other three plaintiffs. He testified that he was to
sell at $100.00 per house; that no monies except loan costs
were to be received from the purchaser of a house; that such
monies received were not to be divided by the broker or the
salesmen; that it would be some time before the broker was
to get the first portion of the commission; that when the houses
were at various stages of completion the broker was to get
various commission draws; that commission payments were
to be on a deferred basis; that he inquired of defendants about
the collection of monies from Felt Syndicate; that he never
demanded payment from Wright-Wirthlin; that he received
various disbursements without protest.

13
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In accord with the testimony of the plaintiffs, .1\lr. Wirthlin,
one of the defendants, testified that the proposed compensation
per house sold was to be $100.00 (R. 151, 161); that the
commissions were to be paid on a deferred basis as the house
construction progressed; that the salesman's share of the commissions earned would be paid over upon receipt of the commissions from the seller (R. 161); th.at the proportionate
share of the monies received from the seller has been disbursed to the salesmen; that any monies received in the future
from the seller would likewise be disbursed to the salesmen
(R. 164) ; that the houses have not yet been completed (R. 15 7).
Mr. Walker, a member of the sales force at the time of
the Morningside Heights transaction, and who was present
at the sales meetings at which the sales arrangement was discussed, testified as follows at page 183 of the Record:
etQ. And did he (Mr. Wirthlin) tell you where or
how the money was to be paid ?
'CA. He told us that the money would be paid to us
as fast as it would be paid to them."
Mrs. Ackerson, a member of the sales force at the time
of the same transaction, at page 203 of the Record testified as
follows:
ceQ. And how was the sum to be paid to you?
etA. As the houses were completed. A certain percentage as the brokers received their money."
Mr. Wright, another of the defendants; testified at page
207 of the Record as follows:
etA. We were to receive our money at various stages as
14
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the construction progressed and the salesmen in
turn were to get their money as we were paid ours."
And at page 208:

((Q. Now with reference to your salesmen, how were
they to be paid, Mr. Wright?
((A: They were to receive their proportionate share as
we received ours."
Noting:

( 1) Over half the commissions earned remain uncollected
from the seller.
( 2) Commissions were to be disbursed on a deferred basts
to plaintiffs after receipt from seller by defendants.
( 3) Plaintiffs commissions were to be accumulated by
defendants until a sufficient amount was accumulated to be
paid out in sums of $25.00 or simdar amounts.
( 4) The custom of the real estate business is that the
broker receives the commission money prior to the payment
over to the salesman of his share of a commission.
( 5) Plaintiffs didn't expect defendants to pay plaintiffs
from their own monies nor did they expect payment on a
deal ((gone sour"-then, reasonable minds noting such facts
and considering them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, could not find a present existing contractual duty in defendants to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded. To the contrary, reasonable minds could only conclude that such a duty
had yet to arise.
Ley v. Fred T. Ley and Co., 65 N. Y. S. 2d 843, well states

the law as follows:

15
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((The pertinent law is succinctly stated in Clark's New
York Law of Contracts Vol. 2, Sec. 964, as follows:
(An agreement by a person to make payments to another
from a particular fund to be realized in the future,
if based on a consideration, is valid and binding, but
in such a case the realization of the fund is ordinarily
a condition precedent to any liability on the part of
the promisor to make the payments'."
Mascioni v. Miller, 184 N. E. 473, 261 N.Y. 1 ( 1933)
is a case in point of persuasive authority. In that case a general
contractor promised to pay a sub-contractor for his work and
materials ((Payments to be made as received from the owner."
This was held to make receipt of the money from the owner
an express condition; and the court said that ((the event upon
which that promise would ripen into an absolute immediate
obligation has not oc~urred." Likewise in the instant case the
necessary event-the receipt of the monies from the seller by
the defendants-has not occurred. Until the occurrence of such
an event there is no present existing contractual duty on the
part of defendants. to pay plaintiffs the monies d~manded. This
is inescapably made clear by the testimony of the parties as
to ( 1) the express understanding of the parties, and ( 2) the
custom of the business. Reasonable men can draw but one inference. That inference points to the lack of a present existing
contractual duty on the part of defendants. to pay plaintiffs the
monies demanded.

CONCLUSION
A revie\v of the entire proceedings and the law in relation
thereto shov1s that the evidence is insufficient to support a pres16
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ent contractual duty in defendants to pay plaintiffs the monies
demanded. It is respectfully submitted therefore that the action
of the trial court in entering judgment for defendants and
against the plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
]. REED TUFT
BRUCE S. JENKINS

Counsel for Respondents
53 East 4th South
202 Newhouse Realty Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Received ____________ copies of the foregoing Brief this ___________ _
day of May, 1954.

Counsel for Appellants
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